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The success of a vaccination program is crucially dependent on its adoption by a critical fraction
of the population, as the resulting herd immunity prevents future outbreaks of an epidemic.
However, the effectiveness of a campaign can engender its own undoing if individuals choose to not
get vaccinated in the belief that they are protected by herd immunity. Although this may appear
to be an optimal decision, based on a rational appraisal of cost and benefits to the individual,
it exposes the population to subsequent outbreaks. We investigate if voluntary vaccination can
emerge in a an integrated model of an epidemic spreading on a social network of rational agents
that make informed decisions whether to be vaccinated. The information available to each agent
includes the prevalence of the disease in their local network neighborhood and/or globally in
the population, as well as the fraction of their neighbors that are protected against the disease.
Crucially, the payoffs governing the decision of agents evolve with disease prevalence, resulting
in the co-evolution of vaccine uptake behavior with the spread of the contagion. The collective
behavior of the agents responding to local prevalence can lead to a significant reduction in the
final epidemic size, particularly for less contagious diseases having low basic reproduction number
R0. Near the epidemic threshold (R0 ≈ 1) the use of local prevalence information can result in a
dichotomous response in final vaccine coverage. The implications of our results suggest the nature
of information used by individuals is a critical factor determining the success of public health
intervention schemes that involve mass vaccination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Immunization through the vaccination of populations
has been estimated to annually prevent 2-3 million deaths
from infectious diseases such as measles, diphtheria, per-
tussis and tetanus [1]. This number may rise substan-
tially with the development of strategies to further in-
crease global vaccine coverage [2]. Apart from conferring
a long-term protection against the disease to the vacci-
nated individual, vaccination has an even more impor-
tant community-level benefit. A sufficiently high vaccine
coverage makes it difficult for the pathogen to find sus-
ceptible hosts, thereby conferring herd immunity to the
whole population [3, 4]. Consequently, even those mem-
bers of the community who are unable to get vaccinated,
such as newborns and immune-suppressed individuals,
are protected against the disease. In principle, any dis-
ease caused by a pathogen that only has human hosts can
be eradicated by mass immunization. Such an outcome
has been realized for smallpox [5, 6] and is expected to
be achieved for polio [7, 8]. Conversely, the presence of a
significant fraction of non-immunized individuals, which
disrupts the population’s herd immunity, can result in
the recurrent outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases
such as measles, mumps and pertussis [9]. Elucidating
the mechanisms that promote wider acceptance of vacci-
nation in the population can therefore help explicate the
reasons behind the failure of immunization programs.
One of the most important challenges in implement-
ing an effective immunization program is to ensure that
enough individuals voluntarily decide to vaccinate. This
decision could be based on many factors such as an indi-
vidual’s knowledge about the costs, including perceived
side-effects, and benefits of vaccination, as well as the
social, economic and cultural environment to which they
belong [10, 11]. The lack of public confidence in the ef-
ficacy and/or safety of vaccines can give rise to vaccine
hesitancy (i.e., delay or refusal to get vaccinated despite
the availability of vaccine services) [12], and in extreme
cases generate vaccine scares [13, 14]. Even in the ab-
sence of any bias against a vaccine as such, vaccine up-
take in the population may vary over time with changing
prevalence of the disease. Indeed, it is expected that in-
dividuals will be more likely to get themselves vaccinated
when there is a higher risk of getting infected [15]. Con-
versely, low disease incidence may often lead to a sig-
nificant drop in vaccine uptake, presumably because of
the lower perceived risk of contracting the disease [16].
This suggests that when the threat of infection is high
the individual has a strong incentive to get vaccinated,
while at times of lower risk she may be tempted to avoid
vaccination and free-ride on the herd immunity provided
by immunized members of a population without bearing
any cost herself. However, if everyone argues in this man-
ner and avoids vaccination, it would leave the population
completely exposed to invasion by the pathogen. This is
essentially an instance of a social dilemma [17] that often
arises in strategic interactions between rational individ-
uals. That is, while free-riding appears to be optimal
from an individual’s perspective, it leads to a clearly un-
desirable collective outcome. This is one of the problems
central to game theory, which therefore provides a nat-
ural framework for understanding the conditions under
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2which a population of rational individuals will voluntar-
ily decide to get vaccinated.
Earlier studies of interaction between disease spread-
ing and vaccine uptake behavior that incorporated a
game theoretic framework have typically assumed homo-
geneous, well-mixed populations [18–20]. Thus, the risk
of infection for every individual, as well as the protec-
tion offered to them by immunized individuals in their
neighborhood, is identical. However, in reality, individu-
als interact primarily with neighboring members of their
social networks and can have widely different contact
structures [21]. Considering the network microstructure
governing contacts between individuals can explain as-
pects of the collective outcomes of spreading contagion
processes [22] and strategic interactions [23] that do not
manifest in well-mixed models of populations. However,
models that investigate vaccine uptake behavior by in-
dividuals in social networks typically do not incorporate
strategic considerations in terms of explicit payoffs, i.e.,
the net benefit associated with specific collective actions.
Instead, agents are assumed to imitate the behavior of
their more “successful” neighbor [24]. As models incor-
porating strategic decision-making and those utilizing so-
cial network approaches each describe different aspects
of vaccine uptake behavior [25], a framework combining
both may come closer at capturing the complexity asso-
ciated with such behavior in reality.
To understand the interaction between human behav-
ior and epidemic dynamics [26, 27], in this paper we
present a model in which rational agents take strategic
decisions to vaccinate themselves on the basis of informa-
tion about the disease prevalence and the immune status
of their neighbors on a social network. Each agent decides
their action by playing a game against a hypothetical op-
ponent who shares the same neighborhood as it. Unlike
previous studies that use a similar framework of strategic
interactions, in our model the payoffs defining the struc-
ture of the game incorporate real-time information on the
specific situation prevailing in the network neighborhood
and consequently vary dynamically amongst individuals.
Thus, the games played by the different agents co-evolve
with the spread of the disease across the network, re-
sulting in an emergent spatio-temporal heterogeneity in
the nature of the games. We find that this heterogene-
ity at the level of individual agents can have significant
implications for population-level outcomes such as the
final epidemic size and the extent of vaccine coverage.
We also examine how the source of the information, viz.,
global (fraction of the population that is infected) or lo-
cal (fraction of infected neighbors), that agents may use
in assessing the risk of getting infected can lead to very
different collective outcomes. The implications of our
results reported here suggest that access to real-time in-
formation about the state of an evolving epidemic can
change the risk perception and affect the vaccine uptake
decisions taken by individuals. These in turn result in
emergent patterns of collective choice behavior that may
provide useful insights into the mechanisms driving vac-
cine acceptance, which could be relevant for public health
planning.
II. MODEL AND METHODS
In our model, we study the dynamics of two coupled
processes, namely epidemic spreading and the evolution
of vaccine uptake behavior, on a social network of N
agents. The connection topology of the network is speci-
fied by the contact structure among individuals in a given
population. The time-scale of an epidemic considered
here is much shorter than durations over which the net-
work structure may change significantly as a result of
births, deaths and migrations of individuals. The spread
of the disease over the network changes the status of an
agent which, at any instant, can be in one of three pos-
sible states, namely, susceptible (S), infected (I), and
recovered (R). We assume that recovery from the dis-
ease confers immunity from further infection to an agent.
The disease is assumed to spread through direct contact
between agents with a transmission probability β, while
infected agents recover from the disease after an average
time period of τI . Thus, the disease dynamics follows
the well-known SIR model [28]. Introducing vaccination
in this framework allows a susceptible individual to avoid
the possibility of getting infected by immediately achiev-
ing an immune status (which effectively corresponds to
the R state).
As an epidemic propagates through the population,
each agent can have access to local information about
the number of infected cases among her network neigh-
bors (i.e., with whom she has direct contact), as well as
global information about the disease prevalence in the
entire network. In reality, such information is obtained
through different channels, e.g., via mass-media in the
case of global information and through word of mouth
for local information. The agents also have informa-
tion about the extent to which their neighborhood of-
fers them protection from the disease. This is provided
by their knowledge of how many of their neighbors are
immune as a result of either having recovered from the
disease earlier, or through vaccination. Each agent uti-
lizes the above information to determine their likelihood
of getting infected. Based on this threat perception, the
agents subsequently make a strategic decision on whether
to get vaccinated by taking into account the “cost” asso-
ciated with vaccination. This cost arises from the threat
of side-effects, either real or perceived, as well as the ef-
fort involved in getting vaccinated, and tempts the agent
to free-ride on the protection that may be offered by the
immunity of their neighbors. By engaging in such behav-
ior agents can enjoy the benefits of immunization with-
out bearing the cost of getting vaccinated themselves.
However, if every agent argues along the same lines, it
will lead to extremely low vaccine uptake, causing the
loss of herd immunity and exposing the population to
the risk of an epidemic outbreak of a vaccine-preventable
3disease. This results in a dilemma for a population of
well-informed rational agents.
As a game-theoretic framework provides a natural set-
ting for investigating such social dilemmas, we model the
vaccine uptake decision process of individual agents in
terms of games. In order to make a strategic decision
each agent plays a symmetric 2-person game against a hy-
pothetical opponent who shares the same neighborhood
and hence has identical information. At each round of
the game, an agent has a choice of two possible actions,
i.e., to get vaccinated (v) or not (n). The cost and bene-
fit associated with the choices is represented in terms of
a payoff matrix. An important feature of our approach
is that the payoffs evolve with the progress of the epi-
demic and the ensuing change in vaccine coverage in the
population. The payoff received by the focal player j,
where j ∈ [1, N ], is represented by a function of the form
Uxy(fi, fp), where x, y ∈ {n, v} are the actions of the
focal player and the virtual opponent, respectively (see
table in Fig. 1). Here, fp is the fraction of neighbors that
are immune and fi is a linear combination of local and
global information about the disease prevalence:
fi(j) = α(I/N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
global
+ (1− α)(ki(j)/k(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
local
.
Note that I is the number of infected agents in a popu-
lation of size N , while k(j) is the total number of neigh-
bors of the focal agent j, of which ki(j) individuals are
infected. By tuning the parameter α ∈ [0, 1], we can con-
sider any information scenario between the two extreme
cases wherein an agent uses exclusively local (α = 0) or
global (α = 1) information.
As mentioned earlier, a high disease prevalence (i.e.,
large value of fi) will act as an incentive for the focal
agent to get vaccinated. Therefore, as the benefits of
vaccination outweigh its cost when prevalence is high, it
is reasonable to assume that the values of the payoffs as-
sociated with the decision to vaccinate increase with the
increase in prevalence. In other words, Uvv(fi, fp) and
Uvn(fi, fp) are increasing functions of fi. Additionally,
when all her neighbors are immune to the disease, there
is a high probability that the focal agent will success-
fully escape infection even without vaccination. Hence,
we assume that values of the payoffs associated with the
decision to not vaccinate increase with the increase in
the fraction of protected neighbors. This suggests that
Unv(fi, fp) and Unn(fi, fp) are increasing functions of fp.
For concreteness, we choose the simplest possible linear
functional form for Unv, Unn, Uvv and Uvn as follows:
Unv = afp + b, Unn = cfp + d,
Uvn = efi + f, Uvv = gfi + h.
This linear form in fi and fp has the added advantage
of not having multiple solutions (i.e., Nash equilibria, ex-
plained later) for any particular choice of fi and fp, which
would have required invoking additional selection crite-
ria for choosing among them. As the payoff functions are
time-varying, the nature of the game can change depend-
ing on the hierarchical relation between the payoffs that
prevails at any instant.
To characterize the hierarchy of payoff functions in
the (fp, fi) space, we note that when fi is high and
fp → 1, it is possible to escape infection as long as most
of the neighbors are immune but in the absence of pro-
tection from the neighborhood, vaccination is vital to
an individual. This suggests the following relation be-
tween payoffs: Unv > Uvv > Uvn > Unn, i.e., the game
is Hawk-Dove [29]. When fi is low and fp → 1, the
non-vaccinators prevail as there a very low risk of infec-
tion and most of the population is immune to the dis-
ease. This would result in Unv > Unn > Uvv > Uvn,
i.e., the game is Deadlock [30]. When fi is high and
fp → 0, the benefits of vaccination outweigh the per-
ceived cost of vaccination because of the high risk of
contracting disease. This results in the hierarchal re-
lation Uvv > Uvn > Unv > Unn, i.e., the game is
Harmony [31]. When fi is low and fp → 0, it is ex-
tremely tempting to not get vaccinated because of low
prevalence. However the possibility of being infected is
non-zero, which makes vaccination a viable choice. This
results in Unv > Uvv > Unn > Uvn, i.e., the game is
Prisoner’s Dilemma [32] (see Fig. 1, inset). These four
games govern the preference that an agent has for each
action (viz., to vaccinate or to not vaccinate) at the four
extremities of the (fi, fp) parameter space. In the in-
terior of this space, the hierarchies among the payoffs
gradually change, thereby giving rise to different games.
To ascertain that the system behaves in the same way
as explained above at these four extremities, we choose
the parameters a − h such that Unv, Unn, Uvn and Uvv
satisfies the inequalities mentioned above. The payoff as-
sociated with not getting vaccinated when the opponent
chooses to vaccinate (Unv) is always greater than the cor-
responding payoff for the case where of both do not get
vaccinated (Unn), as the latter situation exposes both to
the risk of being infected. We hence set a = c without
loss of generality. Similarly, the payoff received when
both players get vaccinated (Uvv) is always greater than
that obtained when only the focal player is vaccinated
vaccinated (Uvn) as she alone bears the cost associated
with vaccination. We hence set e = g without loss of
generality. If the parameters a-h satisfy the following
relation:
a+ b > e+ h > e+ f > b, a+ d > h > d > f,
then the situations discussed above (Hawk-Dove, Dead-
lock, Harmony and Prisoners’ Dilemma) will prevail at
the four extremities of the (fi, fp) space.
As the epidemic spreads in the population each sus-
ceptible agent j will, at any time t, choose an action
such that a unilateral change of action will not yield a
higher payoff. In game theory, such an action profile is
known as a Nash equilibrium [33]. If player j (and her
opponent) decides to vaccinate with probability pj (po)
and not vaccinate with probability 1 − pj (1 − po), the
4expected utility for agent j can then be calculated as
j = pj(po(Uvv + Unn − Unv−Uvn) + Uvn − Unn)
+ po(Uvn − Unn) + Unn.
Given that the game is symmetric, the Nash equilibrium
would be either pj = 0 or pj = 1 if it is pure, or if
it is mixed then the agent j would vaccinate with the
probability
pj =
Unn − Uvn
Uvv + Unn − Unv − Uvn .
Note that the expression for the vaccination probability
for a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is similar to the
strategy referred as mixed ESS in the Bishop-Cannings
theorem [34]. As this probability will be different for
each susceptible agent, it introduces heterogeneity in the
decision making process over the network. Also, as this
probability can change with time, an agent can change
her decision as the disease spreads over the network. In-
corporating such spatio-temporally varying strategies for
the vaccine uptake of agents on a network presents a
more realistic way of examining the coupled dynamics of
vaccination and disease.
In order to study the consequences of the interplay be-
tween the strategic decision-making process for vaccine
uptake and epidemic spreading, we simulate the stochas-
tic spread of a directly transmitted disease on empiri-
cal social networks of villages in southern India [35], as
well as model networks. All agents in our model are
initially susceptible and 0.5% of the nodes in a network
are randomly chosen to become infected to simulate the
onset of an epidemic. Note that no node is initially in
a vaccinated state. We employ the Gillespie stochastic
evolution algorithm [36] to determine the time at which
the next event will happen and which node would take
part in that event. The event could be one of the three
different types of transitions that can change the state
of a node: (i) disease transmission (S → I), (ii) recov-
ery (I → R), and (iii) vaccination (S → R). Disease
transmission is a contact-dependent transition and can
take place only when node j in state S is in contact (i.e.,
has a connecting link) with nodes in state I. Recovery
is a time-dependent transition and depends on the time
interval spent by a node j in infected state (for more
details see [37]). Vaccination is an information-driven
transition, which involves strategic decision making (as
shown in Fig. 1). The simulation is stopped when there
are no infected nodes remaining in the network.
III. RESULTS
The goal of our model is to see whether voluntary vac-
cination can emerge as a result of strategic decision mak-
ing in response to an epidemic threat and if so, what role
the source of information (local and global) may play in
shaping this response. Fig. 2 shows the results obtained
FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the coupling between
the spread of an epidemic and strategic vaccine uptake be-
havior by individuals. Agents are classified according to their
state with respect the disease as Susceptible (S), Infected (I),
Recovered (R) and Vaccinated (V). The two layers represent
the states of the nodes at two time instants. The broken lines
represent the change in the state of agents and grey solid lines
represent the flow of information about the state (infected and
removed) of agents in the network. The curved arrow between
the two layers represents the update (time evolution) of the
system. The broken curve encloses the game-theoretic pro-
cess that determines whether an agent decides to vaccinate
or not, based on the probability of an agent choosing to get
vaccinated P (S → V ). The table inside the broken curve is
a payoff matrix used by an agent to make decisions. Here
the “opponent” is a hypothetical agent having identical infor-
mation, choices of actions and associated payoffs. The payoff
received by the focal player is represented by a function of the
form Uxy(fi, fp), where x and y are, the actions of the focal
player and opponent respectively. The fractions of infected
and protected (immune) agents are represented by fi and fp,
respectively. By varying these two parameters the nature of
the game can change between different classes, as shown in
the inset to the lower left.
for a simulated epidemic on the social network of one the
75 villages in southern India from the data set of [35].
We stress, however that our results are qualitatively sim-
ilar for other choices of social network (as shown in the
subsequent figure). Fig. 2(a-b) illustrates the final out-
come of a simulated epidemic with transmission proba-
bility β = 0.025 and average infectious period τI = 10
on the empirical social network of a specific village (vil-
5FIG. 2. Simulation results for the co-evolution of epidemic
spreading and vaccine uptake behavior in the largest con-
nected component of a social network in a village of southern
India [35] (village 55 [37]) with N = 1180 and 〈k〉 = 9.78.
A snapshot of the network showing the final states of nodes
following a simulated epidemic with β = 0.025 and τI = 10 is
shown for (a) α = 0 and (b) α = 1. The colors of the nodes
are representative of the final state: blue, susceptible; yellow,
vaccinated; red, recovered (i.e., infected during the epidemic).
(c) A sample time series showing the evolution of S, I,R and
V for a simulated epidemic with β = 0.025 and τI = 10 for
α = 0 (left) and α = 1 (right). The inset of (c) provides a
closer view of the sudden emergence of vaccination when the
prevalence becomes sufficiently high. A comparison of the fi-
nal fraction of agents (d) infected f(I∞) and (e) vaccinated
f(V∞) during a simulated epidemic with different values of
R0, for α = 0 and α = 1. Each of the points represents the
median of 1000 simulation runs and the patches indicate the
interquartile range (IQR).
lage 55 in the data set), for two different values of α.
The blue color represents the nodes that escaped infec-
tion without getting vaccinated. Note that as all nodes
were initially susceptible, the vaccine uptake behavior is
entirely epidemic-driven. It is evident from the figure
that more agents experience the disease (as indicated by
red colored nodes) when the information available about
prevalence is global (α = 1) as compared to when it is lo-
cal (α = 0), although the vaccine coverage (as indicated
by yellow colored nodes) is almost same. To understand
the reason behind this disparity in the final outcome of
FIG. 3. Simulation results for the co-evolution of epidemic
spreading and vaccine uptake behavior in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi net-
works with N = 1024 and 〈k〉 = 10. (a) A sample time series
showing the evolution of S, I,R and V for a simulated epi-
demic with β = 0.02 and τI = 10 is displayed for α = 0
(left) and α = 1 (right). We display a comparison of the
final fraction of agents that are (b) infected f(I∞) and (c)
vaccinated f(V∞) during a simulated epidemic with different
values of R0, for α = 0 and α = 1. Each point represents
the median of 1000 simulation runs and the patches indicate
the corresponding IQR. (c) Dependence of crossover area A
on average node degree 〈k〉 behaves similarly in a empirical
social networks and model random networks. The solid line
and patch shows the median and IQR of the 1000 simulated
epidemics on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks respectively. The circle
and error bars represent the median and IQR of the 1000
simulated epidemic on social network of villages in southern
India that have a largest connected component greater than
1000.
epidemic simulated when considering different sources of
information, we consider the time evolution of the frac-
tion of nodes in different states, as shown in Fig. 2(c).
For α = 0, the final fraction of agents that were infected
during the epidemic, f(I∞), is 0.17 and the final frac-
tion of agents vaccinated during the epidemic, f(V∞),
is 0.22. In contrast, for the case α = 1, f(I∞) is 0.42
and f(V∞) is 0.19. Hence, even though f(V∞) is simi-
lar for the two cases, there is a significant difference in
the value of f(I∞). It is clear from the figure that vol-
untary vaccination behavior emerges much later in the
case α = 1 (at t = 20) as compared to α = 0, where
6FIG. 4. (a) Assessing the dependence of f(V∞) in a network
having average node degree 〈k〉 = 10 on population size N .
The results are shown for α = 0 (top) and α = 1 (bottom).
(b) Bimodality coefficient BC for the probability distribution
of V∞ calculated over 2000 trials for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
with N = 16384 and 〈k〉 = 10, and shown over the range
of values of R0 and α. (c) Probability distribution of V∞ as
a function of R0, calculated over 2000 trials, and shown for
different values of α.
it emerges almost immediately after initiating the simu-
lated epidemic. As highlighted in the inset of the right
panel of Fig. 2(c), in the case α = 1 the agents start get-
ting vaccinated when the epidemic prevalence becomes
significantly high. This emergent behavior is a reasonable
description of how responses to epidemics typically un-
fold. For instance, the media usually reports an outbreak
only when the reported cases of the disease becomes suf-
ficiently high. Once a disease has affected a significant
proportion of population, even a subsequent high vaccine
coverage would be unable to reduce the final fraction of
infected agents. To test the robustness of these results
with regard to the contagiousness of the epidemic, we
simulated the epidemic with different values of R0. For
each value of R0 we run 1000 trials to average over the
effect of noise on the final size of the epidemic and vac-
cine coverage. On comparing the final outcome of these
simulations, it is apparent that the value of f(I∞) for
α = 1 is always greater than the corresponding value for
α = 0, independent of any choice of R0 (Fig. 2(d)). This
underpins the previous observation that the epidemic in-
fects a larger proportion of agents in the network when
agents decide to get vaccinated based on the informa-
tion about the global disease prevalence, as compared to
local. However, a comparison of f(V∞) for α = 0 and
α = 1 reveals a more complex situation (see Fig. 2 e).
For both low and high values of R0, f(V∞) is higher for
α = 0 than for α = 1, but there is an intermediate range
of R0 in which the values of f(V∞) for α = 1 are higher
than for α = 0. Thus, there is a crossover of both the
curves of f(V∞) for α = 0 and α = 1. This shows that an
epidemic simulated with these intermediate values of R0
results in higher vaccine coverage when agents base their
vaccination coverage on the global information as com-
pared to local. An important point to note here is that
the effect of high vaccine coverage in this regime of R0
for α = 1 is not reflected in the final size of the epidemic
(Fig. 2(d)). This shows that even if the vaccine coverage
in this regime of R0 is high, the simulated epidemic af-
fects more agents for α = 1 than for the case α = 0. A
possible explanation of this is that in the case of global
information the threat perception does not appear signif-
icant unless a large proportion of agents are affected by
the epidemic and hence fails to overcome the perceived
cost of vaccination. This results in limited vaccine up-
take which does not provide any significant check on the
spread of the epidemic.
To gain more insight into the dynamics of the model,
we simulated epidemics on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with
N = 1024 and average degree 〈k〉 = 10, for both α = 0
and α = 1 (see Fig. 3(a-c)). The results are consistent
with those obtained for the empirical social network. To
see how the crossover behavior near epidemic threshold
depends on the average degree 〈k〉 of the network, we
simulated the epidemic on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks having
different average degree and on empirical social networks
from the dataset of [35] with LCC > 1000. We calculated
the area A enclosed between the two f(V∞) vs R0 curves
for α = 0 and α = 1. In Fig. 3(d), we have shown how
this area decreases with an increase in the value of 〈k〉.
This indicates that this intriguing behavior is dependent
on the average degree of network.
In order to examine how the results are affected by the
size of the population being considered, we display the
dependence of f(V∞) on N for α = 0 (top) and α = 1
(bottom) in Fig. 4(a). We observe that the change in
the values of f(I∞) and f(V∞) with respect to R0 show
similar behavior on increasing the size N of the network.
The f(V∞) versus R0 curves for these two different values
of α show two different kinds of behavior, on increasing
the system size. To investigate this change in behavior,
we looked into the probability distribution of f(V∞) cal-
culated over 2000 trials. We found that for α = 1 this
distribution is unimodal for all values of R0, whereas for
α = 0 a bimodal distribution is observed for some val-
ues of R0, i.e. the probability distribution has peaks at
two different locations. To identify where this behavior
changes in the (R0, α) parameter space, we computed the
value of the Bimodality coefficient BC [38] for the proba-
bility distribution of V∞ [shown in Fig. 4(b)]. It suggests
that the probability distribution of V∞ is bimodal for
values of α < 0.5. This can be observed from Fig. 4(c),
which shows how the probability distribution of f(V∞)
changes on increasing the value of α from 0 to 1. This
7can be a potential signature of a subcritical (discontinu-
ous) transition for local information and a supercritical
(continuous) transition for global information.
IV. DISCUSSION
Vaccine hesitancy typically rises with decreasing dis-
ease incidence as a consequence of reduced risk percep-
tion among individuals of contracting the disease. Un-
derstanding the mechanisms driving such behavior is im-
portant as it can reverse the success of any immuniza-
tion program close to achieving the eradication of a dis-
ease [39]. We utilize the framework of game theory to
investigate vaccine uptake behavior, as it provides an in-
tuitive description for the action of rational agents, i.e.
in absence of any social or religious bias against decision
to get vaccinated. In contrast to previous approaches, we
simulate the spread of an infectious disease on a social
network, where each agent can, at every time step, decide
whether to get vaccinated. The decision-process of each
agent is modelled by a game, in which the payoffs for
different actions vary over time as the epidemic progress
and the immunization status of the neighboring agents
change. Each agent plays against a hypothetical oppo-
nent who shares the same neighborhood and thus has
identical information, imposing symmetry on the payoff
matrix. We examined whether information about an epi-
demic outbreak at the local or global level can lead to
the emergence of voluntary vaccine uptake behavior in a
population of agents that are aware of the benefits of free-
riding on the immunity of their peers. In particular, we
focused on how spatio-temporal heterogeneity in individ-
uals’ vaccine uptake decisions can affect the overall vac-
cine coverage at the population level, and consequently
determine the fate of an epidemic outbreak.
We observe that a defining factor for efficient disease
control through voluntary vaccination is the source of in-
formation. Higher vaccine coverage is observed for the
case when individuals assess their risk of catching infec-
tion based on the prevalence in the local social network
neighborhood, as opposed to that in the whole popula-
tion of their social network. The magnitude of global
prevalence expressed as the fraction of the entire popu-
lation size is low in the initial phase of the epidemic, and
hence does not appear to pose a severe threat. Conse-
quently, the perception of risk in contracting the disease
takes some time to become significant enough to incite
vaccine uptake among individuals. However, by the time
global prevalence becomes high enough so that the per-
ceived risk of infection outweighs the cost of vaccination,
the epidemic will have already affected a large fraction of
the population. We find that this delay in the emergence
of vaccination behavior can sometimes manifest as a large
final size of the epidemic despite high vaccine coverage.
On the other hand, the presence of disease in an agent’s
neighborhood increases the risk of infection even at the
early stage of an epidemic, and thus leads to an imme-
diate increase in vaccine uptake. This not only increases
the total vaccine coverage but also reduces the burden of
disease. An intriguing observation in the case of agents
using local information is that the emergence of volun-
tary vaccination results in a bimodal final epidemic size
and vaccine coverage for diseases with R0 ≈ 1. This be-
havior, observed close to the epidemic threshold, can be
attributed to a tight competition between the two possi-
ble final outcomes for the state of an initially susceptible
individual, namely to get vaccinated or to get infected.
Previous game theory based models of vaccination
during epidemic outbreaks have considered the effect
of strategic decision-making in well-mixed populations
where all individuals have the same risk assessment [18,
19]. In contrast, our model captures the impact of inho-
mogeneous risk and benefit perception at the individual
level, which gives rise to spatio-temporally diverse games
and hence different Nash equilibria across the population.
Consequently, the whole population would never con-
verge to a state in which every agent has the same strat-
egy, unless the disease is completely eradicated. This also
rules out the possibility that the strategic decision to vac-
cinate will disappear from the population with time, as
suggested by models that utilize imitation game dynam-
ics to describe vaccination behavior [24]. These mod-
els suggest that the persistence of high vaccine coverage
can only be ensured by incentivising vaccine distribution.
However, we find that voluntary vaccination can emerge
as a response to the potential threat of an epidemic out-
break if each agent utilizes the information available to
them and makes a rational decision whether getting vac-
cinated might be beneficial to her or not.
One of the key assumptions that underpins our ap-
proach is that agents are well-informed and make rational
decisions based on the information available to them. We
have investigated how such rational decision-making af-
fects the final size and vaccine coverage for diseases with
different contagiousness (i.e. R0). However, it is possi-
ble to augment our model with additional parameters so
that it captures the effect of those features of the dis-
ease which are qualitatively different from disease conta-
giousness, such as case fatality ratio. In such a scenario,
two diseases with comparable R0, such as Ebola and In-
fluenza, and thus similar transmission rate and vaccina-
tion costs, could result in different coverages, based on
the subjective perception of how harmful (or severe) a
disease is. Another potential extension of our work is to
consider the effect of negative sentiments (anti-vaccine
sentiments or vaccine scares) [40], and examine whether
the increased chances of catching the infection due to
an ongoing epidemic, or witnessing the disease in one’s
vicinity, can help to close the immunization gap.
We would like to stress that our results are indepen-
dent of population size and meso-level structural details,
such as the existence of modularity, but depend strongly
on the degree (average number of contacts a person has)
of the network. This could partly be because we are
primarily considering the final outcome of the simulated
8epidemics, such as final epidemic size and total vaccine
coverage. Another potential reason is that the strategic
decision making in our model depends crucially on the
neighborhood which is a micro-level detail of the social
network. From a policy-making viewpoint, it is easier to
estimate how many social contacts a person has on av-
erage rather than meso- and macro-level details, which
widens the scope of our model and its results. We also
stress on the importance of taking into account the het-
erogeneity in the disease status of neighbors in a social
network for risk assessment when deciding whether to
vaccinate. The prevalence aggregated over the whole
population may sometimes result in a false perception
of risk, especially if the disease is in one’s vicinity. The
key outcome for public health planning is that accurate
and localized reporting of disease outbreak is crucial for
changing individuals’ risk perception and thereby their
attitude towards vaccination, especially during the ini-
tial phase of an epidemic.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Kaja Abbas, Samit Bhat-
tacharyya, Chandrashekar Kuyyamudi, Jose Ruedallano
and Stefan Schuster for helpful discussions. This work
was supported in part by the IMSc Complex Systems
Project (12th Plan). The simulations and computations
required for this work were supported by High Perfor-
mance Computing facility (Nandadevi) of The Institute
of Mathematical Sciences, which is partially funded by
DST.
[1] World Health Organization. Immunization coverage.
http://who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs378/en/
[2] Centers for Disease Control And Prevention.
CDC’s Strategic Framework for Global Immu-
nization, 2016–2020 Atlanta, GA: May 2016.
www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/immunization
[3] Anderson R. M. & May R. M., Vaccination and herd im-
munity to infectious diseases, Nature 318, 323–9 (1985).
[4] Heesterbeek H. et al., Modeling infectious disease dynam-
ics in the complex landscape of global health, Science
347, aaa4339 (2015).
[5] Fenner F., Henderson D. A., Arita I., Jezek A. Z. & Lad-
nyi I. D., Smallpox and its Eradication World Health Or-
ganization, Geneva (1988).
[6] Orenstein W. A. & Ahmedb R., Simply put: Vaccina-
tion saves lives, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 114, 4031–3
(2017).
[7] Larson H. J. & Ghinai I., Lessons from polio eradication,
Nature 473, 446–7 (2011).
[8] World Health Organization. Global vaccine action plan,
Secretariat annual report 2016. I.1 Disease elimina-
tion. http://www.who.int/immunization/global_
vaccine_action_plan/gvap_2016_secretariat_
report_poliomyelitis.pdf
[9] Centers for Disease Control And Prevention.
Reported cases and deaths from vaccine pre-
ventable diseases, United States, 1950–2013.
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/
downloads/appendices/E/reported-cases.pdf
[10] de Figueiredo A., et al. Forecasted trends in vaccination
coverage and correlations with socioeconomic factors: A
global time-series analysis over 30 years, Lancet Glob.
Health 4, e726–35 (2016).
[11] Wessel L., Vaccine myths, Science 356, 368–72 (2017).
[12] Larson H. J., Jarrett C., Eckersberger E., Smith D. M.
& Paterson P., Understanding vaccine hesitancy around
vaccines and vaccination from a global perspective: A
systematic review of published literature, 2007-2012,
Vaccine 32, 2150–9 (2014).
[13] Black S. & Rappuoli R., A crisis of public confidence in
vaccines, Sci. Transl. Med. 2, 61mr1 (2010).
[14] Larson H. J., Vaccine trust and the limits of information,
Science 353, 1207-8 (2016).
[15] Horne Z., Powell D., Hummel J. E. & Holyoak K. J.,
Countering anti-vaccination attitudes. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 112,10321–4 (2015).
[16] Jansen V. A. A., et al., Measles outbreaks in a population
with declining vaccine uptake, Science 301, 804 (2003).
[17] Feh E. & Fischbacher U., The nature of human altruism,
Nature 425, 785-91 (2003)
[18] Bauch C. T & Earn D. J. D., Vaccination and the theory
of games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 101, 391–4 (2004).
[19] Bauch C. T., Galvani A. P. & Earn D. J. D., Group
interest versus self interest in smallpox vaccination policy,
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 100, 564–7 (2003).
[20] Bauch C. T., Imitation dynamics predict vaccinating be-
haviour, Proc. R. Soc. B 272, 1669–75 (2005).
[21] Wasserman S. & Faust K., Social network analysis: meth-
ods and applications, Cambridge University Press (1994).
[22] Barrat A., Barthelemy M. & Vespignani A., Dynami-
cal processes on complex networks, Cambridge University
Press (2008).
[23] Szabo G. & Fath G., Evolutionary games on graphs,
Phys. Rep. 446, 97–216 (2007).
[24] Feng F., Rosenbloom D. I., Wang L. & Nowak M. A.,
Imitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour on social
networks, Proc. R. Soc. B 278, 42–9 (2011).
[25] Wang Z. et al., Statistical physics of vaccination, Phys.
Rep. 664, 1–113 (2016).
[26] Ferguson N., Capturing human behaviour, Nature 446,
733 (2007).
[27] Funk S., Salathe M. & Jansen V. A., Modelling the influ-
ence of human behaviour on the spread of infectious dis-
eases: A review, J. R. Soc. Interface 7, 1247–56 (2010).
[28] Anderson R. M. & May R. M., Infectious diseases of hu-
mans: Dynamics and control, Oxford University Press,
Oxford (1991).
[29] Rapoport A. & Chammah A. M., The game of chicken,
Am. Behav. Sci. 10, 10-28 (1966).
[30] Rapoport A., Two-person game theory: The essential
ideas, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI
(1966).
9[31] Pacheco J. M., Traulsen A. & Nowak M. A., Coevolu-
tion of strategy and structure in complex networks with
dynamical linking, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 (2006).
[32] Rapoport A. & Chammah A. M., Prisoners Dilemma,
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI (1965).
[33] Holt C. A. & Roth A. E., The Nash equilibrium: A per-
spective. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 101, 3999-4002
(2004).
[34] Maynard-Smith J., Evolution and the theory of games,
Cambridge University Press, (1982).
[35] Banerjee A., Chandrasekhar A. G., Duflo E. & Jack-
son M. O., The diffusion of microfinance, Science 341,
1236498 (2013).
[36] Gillespie D. T., Exact stochastic simulation of coupled
chemical reactions, J. Phys. Chem. 81, 2340 (1977).
[37] Jesan T., Kuyyamudi C. & Sinha S., Modularity pro-
motes epidemic recurrence, arXiv:1611.02412 (2016).
[38] Pfister R., Schwarz K. A., Janczyk M., Dale R. & Free-
man J. B., Good things peak in pairs: A note on the
bimodality coefficient, Front. Psychol. 4, 700 (2013).
[39] Saint-Victor D. S. & Omer S. B., Vaccine refusal and
the endgame: Walking the last mile first, Phil. Trans. R.
Soc. B 368, 20120148 (2013).
[40] Larson H. J., Cooper L. Z., Eskola J., Katz S. L. &
Ratzan S., Addressing the vaccine confidence gap, Lancet
378, 526–35 (2011).
